ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
owadays, the interests on patent pools has a fast growing interest as a good alternative means to decrease transaction costs between IPRs owners and promote technology commercialization and diffusion. Patent pools have a very long history and Sewing machine pool at 1856 is known as the first patent pool (Gilbert, 2004) . Recently U.S DoJ(Department of Justice) considers that the patent pools can have pro-competitive effects. In fact, U.S DoJ had affirmed MPEG, 3G, and DVD patent pools as pro-competitive.
Most Existent researches about patent pools mainly have been accomplished by lawyers or law school professors, but recently some economists published research papers on the patent pools. Shapiro(2001) analyzes the effects of paten pools on the downstream market using single-period static model and insists that patent pools can However, existent literatures do not provide more detail analyses about effects of patent pools on innovators' innovation investment. Dequiedt & Versaevel(2004) focus on this issues and analyze the impacts of possible pool formation on the ex-ante incentives to innovate. They show that a firm's investment pattern is upward sloping over time before pool formation but decrease dramatically after pool formation. Therefore, they insist that recently a general pool formation mechanism based on a proposal by the industry and acceptance/refusal by the competition authority may induce overinvestment in early innovations and lead to a delayed clearance date. However, Dequiedt & Versaevel(2004) do not provide the asymmetric effects of possible patent pools on ex-ante innovation investments or incentives of different kind upstream firms and do not consider the strategic behavior of upstream firms. Therefore, in this paper we analyze this issues more detail based on strategic perspectives using a game theoretical economic model. This paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present our theoretical model. In the section 3, we derive market equilibriums for different kind of upstream firms. Then we show more details about the effects of patent pooling on ex-ante innovation investments or incentives of upstream firms. Finally this paper concludes with final remarks.
MODEL
In this paper, we use a generalized 3-stage game theoretical model and analyze the effects of patent pooling on the ex-ante innovation investments or incentives of upstream firms. Before detail analyses, we summarize main assumptions about technology and firms. We assume that each technology owned by all upstream firms is complementary and essential to produce final goods. That is, each downstream firm has to use one unit of each technology owned by all upstream firms to produce final goods. We also assume that there are no vertical restrictions in the package licensing through patent pools and per-unit royalty rates of all upstream firms is nondiscriminatory. 1 k  element technologies, each of which is essential in the production of the final goods. Of the 1 k  firms, k firms engage in both R&D and production, so these are called vertically integrated firms, which will be called as I-firms. The remaining one firm engages in only R&D and technology transfer and we will call it the R-firm. For example, we can regard research labs, universities, or government-funded research institutes as the example of R-firm. We also assume that there are n specialized manufacturing firms, which will be called as M-firms, attending downstream market for producing final goods.
The order of play is as follows. In the first stage, all upstream firms(I-firms and R-firm) compete to develop each element technology and the innovation investments of each upstream firms are represented by
. In this stage, each upstream firm chooses R&D investment level to maximize its expected value function. In the second stage, each upstream firm decides to license independently its own technology at a perunit royalty rate or collectively through patent pools at a pool royalty rate. Finally, in the third stage, I-firms produce final goods at zero cost save for license costs and engage in quantity competition(i.e. Cournot competition) in the product market independently and simultaneously. The products are assumed to be homogeneous and the inverse demand function is given by
P a bQ 
, where Q denotes the total industry output.
While each firm's profit functions are as follows. I-firms' gross profits are given by
And R-firm's gross profit is given by respectively. For the convenience of analysis, we will simplify our model by assuming that all downstream firms, Ifirms and M-firms, produce final goods using the same production technologies and the each firm's marginal cost is the per-unit royalties for licensing in element technologies, that is, marginal production costs for all downstream firms are zero. We also assume that marginal costs 
PRODUCTION AND LICENSING
The game can be solved by backward induction. The equilibrium gross profits, royalty rates, production quantities of final goods, industry output, and price of final goods are dependent on whether upstream firms license independently their technologies or collectively through patent pools at technology transfer stage(2 nd stage). Because R-firm that creates profits from royalty revenues can have incentive for independent licensing even in the case of patent pooling including all I-firms, we obtain the equilibrium gross profits for three cases and then analyze the innovation investment of upstream firms at innovation stage (i.e., 1 st stage).
Independent Licensing
First of all, let us analyze the final goods production stage(3 rd stage). In the independent licensing case, only I-firms produce final goods because there is asymmetry in the cost structure between I-firms and M-firms. That is, M-firms can attend in the final goods production market by paying royalties to all upstream firms, but I-firms don't have to pay royalty for their own patent technology. I-firm ( 1, , ) i i k  sets quantity i q to maximize its expected gross profit i  given by (2.1). Solving for the first-order conditions;
From above FOCs for profit maximization, we can obtain the equilibrium industry gross output as follow.
And the equilibrium final goods production quantity of I-firm ( 1, , ) 
Now let us go back one step to the technology transfer stage. In this stage, all upstream firms which have each essential technology maximize their own gross profits by imposing optimal royalty rates independently. 
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From equation (3.4) and (3.5), we can obtain the optimal equilibrium royalty rates for each firm as follow 2 
3
( 1, , ) 61
Therefore, substituting (3.6) and (3.7) in (3.2), (3.3), (2.1)', and (2.2)', the maximized equilibrium gross profit for I-firms and R-firm are given by
Patent Pooling Among I-firms(IP)
Second, let us analyze the case that all I-firms agree with attending a patent pool but R-firm dose not attend the patent pool. In the convenience, let us call this type of patent pool as Incomplete patent pool(IP). Of course, we can consider other cases that some I-firms attend a patent pool, but we will not consider these cases. We also assume that the patent pool set collectively a per-unit royalty rate 
I-firms and M-firms produce final goods at production stage(3 rd stage). The FOCs for profit maximization
From above FOCs for profit maximization, we can obtain the equilibrium industry gross output, quantity of I-firm ( 1, , ) i i k
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Therefore, we can obtain I-firm i 's, R-firm's, and M-firm j 's equilibrium profits from equation (3.10), (3.11) , and (3.12) as follow
In the technology transfer stage(2 nd stage), R-firm independently maximize its own gross profits( 
IP R
Therefore, substituting (3.17) in (3.10)', (3.11)' and (3.12)', the maximized equilibrium gross profits for Ifirms and R-firm are given by Finally, let us analyze the case that all I-firms and R-firms agree with attending a patent pool. We call this type patent pool as complete patent pool(CP). In this case, all upstream firms(I-firms and R-firm) set a per-unit royalty rate of the pool, CP l , and each firm share the royalty rate. We assume that the royalty shares of R-firm and I- 
We can obtain the optimal royalty rate of the pool and the equilibrium gross profits for I-firms, R-firm, and M-firms by the same process with the previous section. We summarize the results as follow 
Comparison Of Upstream Firms' Equilibrium Gross Profits
To analyze the innovation investments of I-firms and R-firm attending innovation stage, we have to obtain the expected value function for upstream firms at that stage. Therefore, it is necessary to compare the gross profits of upstream firms that depend on the licensing mechanism at technology transfer stage(2 nd stage). For the patent pool cases, we assume that royalty share among upstream firms attending the patent pool is allocated based on the prorata rule. In reality, many patent pools introduce this rule for royalty allocation. Under this assumption, we can summarize the gross profits of I-firms and R-firm according to independent licensing, incomplete patent pool, and complete patent pool as follow. Here we do not give the proof of following propositions because we can easily understand the results by simple comparison.
Proposition 1.
Given that all the component technologies have been successfully developed, the equilibrium gross profits of I-firms according to the licensing strategies satisfy the following:
In the case of small number of licensors, I-firms ( 
In the case of large number of licensors, I-firms ( 8)
For vertically-integrated I-firms, we can see that the complete patent pooling in the technology transfer stage is the most desirable licensing mechanism with independence of I-firms' number. Moreover, we also can see that the results of proposition 1 do not change according to the number of M-firms.
Proposition 2.
Given that all the component technologies have been successfully developed, the equilibrium gross profits of R-firms according to the licensing strategies satisfy the following:
In the case of
 for 07 n , and
For research laboratory R-firm, we can see that the incomplete patent pool with all I-firms but R-firm is the most desirable aspect with independence of the number of I-firms and M-firms.
INNOVATION INVESTMENT
Now let us analyze the innovation staege(1 st stage). To analyze ex-ante innovation investments or incentives of upstream firms, we use well-developed patent race model (Reinganum 1983 (Reinganum , 1986 ). In general, patent race models assume that firms compete for developing a same innovation. Therefore, patent race models may not be suitable to our model because we assume that all upstream firms invest their R&D resources to a different but complementary element technology. But according to the empirical study on the Racing to invest in pharmaceutical R&D by Cockburn and Henderson(1994) , the patent race model is more suitable to a race related to the multiple prize and a continual complementarities between innovations developed by competing firms. Therefore, stochastic patent race model can be appropriate to analyze the ex-ante innovation investments for our multiple element technology development, so we can use the patent race model to analyze the effects of patent pools on the ex-ante innovation investments or incentives.
In the innovation investment stage, all upstream firms, I-firms and R-firm, want to maximize their expected value function. The discounted present value function of expected value for any upstream firm ( 1, , , ) i i k R  at the first stage, is given by 
While we can confirm that the SOC 
Therefore, we can suggest following proposition.
Proposition 3.

The innovation investment between I-firms and R-firm is strategic complement.
Proof) The total derivative of eq'n (4.2) about 1 , , , , 
Q.E.D.
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Now let us investigate the Nash equilibrium of innovation investment for I-firms and R-firm. Here our main interest is the interaction of R&D investment between I-firms and R-firm. From above proposition3, the innovation investments between I-firms and R-firm are strategic complement. This means that the increase in Ifirms' innovation investment gives rise to the increase in R-firm's innovation investment. Therefore, the Nash equilibrium is the intersection of I-firms' best response curve and I-firm's best response curve. Here let us assume Thus this means that the increase of any upstream firms' gross profits enhances their ex-ante innovation investments..
From the above propositions and the positive effects of gross profits on the ex-ante innovation investments, we can suggest following proposition.
Proposition 4.
The equilibrium ex-ante innovation investment of upstream firms according to different licensing strategies satisfies the following: From proposition4, we can see that in the cases of many I-firms owning essential patent technologies, patent pools including only I-firms or all upstream firms can affect asymmetrically on the I-firms' or R-firms' innovation investments. Nonetheless, any types of patent pools make the innovation investments of I-firms and Rfirms higher than those of all firms licensing independently. Therefore, it is very important findings of our research that patent pooling promotes the ex-ante innovation investments of any kind of upstream firms and thus the technologies essential to produce final goods can be developed more fast under possible patent pooling. These results have very important implications to antitrust or competition policy.
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CONCLUDING REMARKS
Recently Patent Pools have a fast growing interest as a good alternative means to decrease transaction costs between IPRs owners and promote technology commercialization and diffusion. We attempt to shed light on the effects of possible patent pools on the upstream firms' innovation incentives or investments. Under ex-ante perspectives, we show that patent pools can asymmetrically affect on the innovation incentive of vertically integrated firms(I-firms) and of research laboratories(R-firms) differently, and the effects depend on the number of I-firms owning essential patents and the number of specially manufacturing firms(M-firms). But in the presence of many I-firms owning essential patents, instruction of patent pooling can increase I-firms' ex-ante innovation incentive or investments with independence of M-firms. We also show that there is strategic complementary relationship between innovation investments of I-firms and those of R-firms, so I-firms' increased ex-ante innovation investments make R-firms' ex-ante innovation investments increasing. Moreover, in the case of R-firms maximizing private profit, the best aspect is to license independently their patent technology when I-firms make up patent pools. But this aspect is not desirable for I-firms because I-firms' gross profit is smaller than that of I-firms which are licensing their patent technologies independently. However, we show that in the cases of many I-firms owning essential patent technologies, patent pools including only I-firms(IP) or all upstream firms(CP) can affect asymmetrically on the I-firms' or R-firms' innovation investments. Nonetheless, any types of patent pools make the innovation investments of I-firms and R-firms higher than those of all firms which are licensing independently. In summary, nowadays under general aspects that production of final goods requires many complex technologies and that many I-firms and R-firms attend R&D for essential technologies, competition authorities' deregulation for patent pooling or government policy supporting the patent pooling can promote upstream firms' innovation incentives or investments and compulsory licensing about R-firms is not necessary for enhancing upstream firms' innovation investments or incentives. Our research is based on the ex-ante perspectives, so the empirical analysis about the effects of patent pooling still remains an important future work.
